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U.S. GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER
THE EXPORT OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
AND OTHER TECHNICAL DATA:
HOLES IN THE SIEVE
Robert Greenspoon*
INTRODUCTION
The main theme of U.S. export restrictions is the non-proliferation
of sophisticated weapons systems to inimical countries.' The web of
export regulations which governs these restrictions is intended to pro-
mote national and international security. Because weapons development
feeds upon scientific advance, the control of weapons technology neces-
sarily brings with it the control of science itself. Resistance to such
control comes from two sources: academia, because of its norms in
favor of intellectual freedom, and industry, because of its norms in favor
of the freedom of markets. This Note addresses the question of whether
export restrictions on scientific data are appropriate and tenable.
In Part I, I establish the backdrop for answering the question by
describing the kinds of scientific data that might be subject to security
classification and export licensing. In Part II, I outline briefly who
chooses what should be restricted and who enforces these restrictions. In
Part III, I describe several situations in which the federal government
has vigorously enforced controls over the dissemination of scientific
information. I also analyze two recent cases involving computer soft-
ware that I believe analogize directly to the scientific endeavor. Finally,
in Part IV, I explain why First Amendment barriers, the growth of the
Internet global computer network, and cultural values peculiar to the
scientific community should assuage most concern about categorizing
scientific research data for national security purposes.
* J.D., University of Michigan (1995); A.B., University of Chicago (1992). The author
would like to thank Professor Rebecca S. Eisenberg, for whose seminar this note was
originally prepared. The author also thanks Gavin Domm, Michael Edmunds, John Felitti,
Beth Fulkerson, Daniel Ginsberg, and Paul Tauber for their helpful suggestions. Finally, the
author thanks John J. Molenda for his friendship and support during the entire project.
1. See, e.g., Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 778.1(a) (1994) (defining
"the types of transactions that are governed by the U.S. policy concerning the non-prolifera-
tion of chemical and biological weapons, nuclear weapons or explosive devices, missiles
systems and the U.S. maritime nuclear propulsion policy."). The export regulations described
in this note derive from the power of the President to make foreign policy. See U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2.
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I. SCIENCE SUBJECT TO EXPORT CONTROL
A. Control by Security Classification
As a general matter, the federal government has two routes by
which it can prevent the export of scientific data - through security
classification or through export licensing. In 1985, to quell concern that
fundamental research might be chilled by export or publication restric-
tions, President Reagan issued a directive on scientific data setting forth
the Executive's presumptive hands-off approach. This directive states
that "to the maximum extent possible, the products of fundamental
research [should] remain unrestricted... . [T]he [preferred] mechanism
for control of information generated during federally funded fundamen-
tal research in science, technology, and engineering at colleges, universi-
ties and laboratories is classification. 2 The directive goes on to state
that no restrictions on the conduct or reporting of unclassified research
may be imposed, "except as provided in applicable U.S. statutes." In
effect, this directive provides thatany U.S. government agency which
supports scientific research by funding or by contract must classify the
research results if national security might be threatened by publication.4
In addition to formal classification by the designations "confiden-
tial," "secret," or "top secret," certain data may be declared "sensitive."
Sensitive but unclassified information is defined as "information the
disclosure, loss, misuse, alteration, or destruction of which could ad-
versely affect national security or other Federal Government interests. '
As a practical matter, data declared as sensitive (i.e., nominally without
particular restrictions on export) will more readily become classified
than non-sensitive data during the regular agency reviewing process.
Because the definition is broad, and because agency discretion may go
2. Sensitive Technologies from Federally Funded Research, Statement by the Principal
Deputy Press Secretary to the President, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1147 (Sept. 27,
1985).
3. Id. at 1148. This caveat allows export control statutes to apply to federally funded
research that goes unclassified.
4. It is difficult to find an explicit definition of "national security." When speaking about
export restrictions, one must be satisfied accepting an operational definition such as, "that
which individuals in government assert is national security." Such decisions are apparently
made on an agency by agency basis. See Note, The National Security Agency and Its Interfer-
ence With Private Secior Computer Security, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1034-36 (1987) [herein-
after NSA Interference].
5, NATIONAL POLICY ON PROTECTION OF SENSITIVE, BUT UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION
IN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND AUTOMATED INFORMATION SYSTEMS,
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY POLICY No. 2, § II
(Oct. 29, 1986) (quoted in NSA Interference, supra note 4, at 1035).
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unreviewed in the classification reviewing process, 6 ultimately the
amount and scope of information that becomes classified increases as
more information is declared to be sensitive.7
B. Control by Export Licensing
In addition to security classification, export licensing is the other
route to U.S. governmental control over scientific and technical informa-
tion. Unlike most restrictions arising from classification, licensing re-
strictions may be imposed upon information which is generated by
private industry or by non-government funded academic research. Sever-
al statutes operate to restrict the export of scientific information notwith-
standing the availability of licensing rights. For example, under the
Invention Secrecy Act,' a government agency may classify a patent
application and delay the issuance of a patent if the invention's dissemi-
nation threatens national security. Under the Atomic Energy Act, 9 infor-
mation about atomic energy is probably considered "born classified," no
matter what its source.' 0 The act with the broadest application to scien-
tific research is the Export Administration Act" (hereinafter EAA).
Under the EAA, the Department of Commerce issues export licenses on
all exports so that the federal government may maintain control over na-
tional security, foreign policy, and short supply situations.'
2
A short exposition of definitions and of types of export licenses will
illustrate that scientific research results are subject to varying degrees of
treatment under the EAA, depending on how proximately aligned the
information is with weapons technology. "Export" of information can be
a shipment of data to another country, a "release" of data with knowl-
edge or intent that it arrive in a foreign country, or a "release" in a
foreign country.' 3 A "release" is a (i) visual inspection by foreign na-
tionals of U.S.-origin equipment and facilities; (ii) oral exchanges of
information in the United States or abroad; or (iii) the application to
6. See NSA Interference, supra note 4, at 1036.
7. Id.
8. 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1988).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1988).
10. See Peter Swan, A Road Map to Understanding Export Controls: National Security
in a Changing Global Environment, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 607, 613 (1993), (citing The Govern-
ment's Classification of Private Ideas: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Com-
mittee on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 144 (1981)).
11. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1988, Supp. 1 1989, & Supp. 11 1990).
12. See Swan, supra note 10, at 617-26. Only national security and foreign policy appear
germane here, as "short supply" of knowledge is an incoherent idea.
13. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 779.1(b)(1).
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situations abroad of personal knowledge or technical experience ac-
quired in the United States.' 4 Technical data includes "[s]pecific infor-
mation necessary for the 'development,' 'production,' or 'use' of a
product. "15
Under the foregoing definition of technical data, all scientific re-
search results, except those which have no application to the fashioning
of "a product," are subject to Department of Commerce licensing for
export. The technique used in the regulations is to create a blanket
prohibition against the export of all technical data and then to delineate
the categories of technical data which may overcome this prohibition via
various types of licenses. 6 Technical data can only be exported under a
validated license unless the regulations otherwise provide.' 7 A validated
license, as might be expected, is one requiring submission to the Office
of Export Licensing of a formal application containing detailed informa-
tion about the recipients of the data and the uses to which the data will
be put.
1. Exceptions to the Filing Requirement for an
Export License: GTDR, GTDU, and GTDA
Within the regulations, specific and general exceptions have been
carved out of the blanket requirement of filing for a validated license for
technical data, and hence scientific research, export. These exceptions
from the filing requirement are embodied in the "general technical data"
licenses: GTDR, GTDU, and GTDA. Export under these exceptions still
carries all of the legal consequences of exporting under a validated
license (including the possibility of revocation), even though an applica-
tion need not be filed.
GTDR and GTDU licenses apply to technical data of specific types
named as eligible on the Department of Commerce's Commodities
Control List (CCL),' 8 and are available for export of data only to "good"
countries, as described below. GTDR licenses require the exporter to
obtain specific written assurances from the foreign importer that the data
will not be released to "bad" countries. GTDU licenses usually involve
14. Id § 779.1(b)(2).
15. Id. § 779.1(a) (emphasis added) (incorporating within "technical data" the definition
of "technology" found in 15 C.F.R. § 799.1, Supp. 3). The 1994 Export Administration
Regulations hint that the definition of "technical data" will undergo revision in the near
future. Id. § 779.1(a). As of March 29, 1995, this revision has not yet been released.
16. Id § 770.3(a).
17. Id. § 779.5(a).
18. Id. § 799.1, Supp. 1.
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de minimis transfers to foreigners of information, such as information
contained in operation technical data, sales technical data, or software
updates.19 Because these transfers are trivial, and collecting foreign
assurances would be burdensome, GTDU licenses require no written as-
surances that bad countries will not receive the data, although penalties
still can be imposed for knowing release of the data to unauthorized
parties.
GTDA licenses, when applicable, may be considered general, in
contrast to specific, exceptions to the requirement for a validated export
license. Data falling within the ambit of a GTDA license may be export-
ed anywhere, and the exporter need neither file an application in the
Department of Commerce nor acquire non-transfer assurances from
foreign importers. The licensing regulations enable most scientific
research to be released under the nonrestrictive GTDA scheme. Four
kinds of technical information may be exported under a GTDA license:
information resulting from fundamental research, information that is
already or will be made publicly available, educational information, and
information in connection with certain patent applications.20
Scientific research primarily falls within the first two classes of
technical information. For example, foreign publication of research
results should usually be unproblematic: notwithstanding other restric-
tions, such as classification, submission of scientific research results to a
foreign journal for the purposes of publication will usually fall under
one or more GTDA licensing classifications. If the research is non-
proprietary, then it is exported under a GTDA license because it is
considered fundamental research. 21 Even if the research is proprietary,
such as research carried out for the purposes of fashioning a commercial
product, it will fall under the GTDA license if sent to a foreign journal
because then it becomes information that will be made publicly avail-
able.22
The same logic applies to open scientific conferences, no matter
where they are held. So long as a conference is open, then proprietary
or fundamental research can be presented under a GTDA license. Unless
exported information qualifies under one of the four kinds of technical
data outlined above which comprise the general exception GTDA cate-
gory, either the validated license or the more restrictive GTDR or
GTDU license is required for its export.
23
19. Id § 779.4.
20. Id § 779.3(a).
21. See id § 779.3(c). This provision also addresses how to treat joint industry-academia
research ventures regarding GTDA eligibility. Id
22. See id. § 779.3(b).
23. Id. §§ 779.3(b), 779.3(c). See also id. § 779.3(0(2). If government contract re-
Winter 1995]
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2. Country Categories Determining which License
Applies to Particular Technical Data
The U.S. categorizes "bad" countries within a handful of lettered
categories which reflect generally the nature and extent of export restric-
tions.24 The countries seemingly most inimical to U.S. interests are listed
in categories S and Z: Cuba, Libya, and North Korea. Thus if particular
technical information is denominated SZ-restricted only, then under a
GTDR license, it can usually be sent to any country except Cuba, Libya,
and North Korea; an application for a validated license would have to
be filed to export it to the SZ group members. Such information is not
very restricted. If particular technical data is listed as QSTVWYZ-re-
stricted, then under a GTDR license, it can usually be sent to any coun-
try not named in the regulations within the lettered groups. Otherwise, a
validated license application would have to be filed. Such information is
very restricted.
A casual perusal of the specific controls imposed upon the numerous
commodities listed in the regulations suggests that the scope of restric-
tion corresponds generally to the ease of military application and the
danger of misuse of the technical information involved.25 Even if the
technical data will never leave the country, licensing regulations may be
a consideration whenever foreign nationals are allowed to work on a
project which would require a GTDR, GTDU, or validated license if
results were exported.26 Both validated and general licenses are subject
to revocation at any time without notice. The revocation provision does
not address the standard by which a license may be revoked.2" A dif-
ferent section of the regulations establishes the vague standard that ship-
strictions on publication or export apply to otherwise GTDA-eligible scientific research
results, then "[s]pecific national security controls" must be agreed upon in the government
research contract. "A general reference to one or more export control laws or regulations or a
general reminder that the Government retains the right to classify is not a 'specific national
security control."' d.
24. See id. pt. 770, Supp. 1; 59 Fed. Reg. 6,524 (1994) (to be codified at id.) (removing
Vietnam from country group Z to country group Y).
25. See, e.g., id. § 799.1, Supp. 1.
26. See id. pt. 779, Supp. 5 (answering common questions regarding licensing, including
many questions concerning the conditions under which the involvement of foreign nationals
necessitates a validated license). In such a case, the nationality of the foreigner may be key.
Id.
27. Id § 770.3(b). I can imagine a casual and unsophisticated exporter being taken by
surprise when a GTDA license not even applied for is revoked without notice. Such a
surprised response would probably be similar to that observed of the optical engineers when
the Department of Defense cracked down on the presentation of .scientific papers at an open
conference in 1982, as described infra part III.
28. See 15 C.F.R. § 770.3(b).
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ments may be prohibited "whenever there is reason to believe that the
export regulations have been, or will be violated." 29
II. CREATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIONS
Jurisdiction over export restrictions is shared by the Departments of
Commerce, State, and Defense. 30 Additionally, the United States is a
member country of the Coordinating Committee of the Consultative
Group'(COCOM), which is a multilateral organization that monitors and
restricts the distribution of military technology to countries outside the
group." Although restrictions may be placed on individual exports on a
case-by-case basis under the EAA, either by the Secretary of Commerce
or by the President on the recommendation of the Secretary of De-
fense,32 the "heart of the control scheme is the Commodity Control List
(CCL). 33 This list is updated at least every three years for items that are
subject to multilateral control, and annually regarding items that are
subject to domestically fashioned restrictions?4 The authority to do so is
vested in Technical Task Groups (TTG's) which are "composed of
technical representatives of various government agencies. 35 In updating
the CCL, the TTG's consider several factors in reviewing items, includ-
ing civilian uses, military uses, technological state of development, and
availability abroad.36
A person found in knowing violation of the EAA (e.g., exporting
technical data under a GTDR license with knowledge that it will be
reexported to a forbidden recipient in violation of the regulations) may
be fined five times the value of the exports or $50,000, whichever is
29. See, e.g., id. § 771.2(c)(1).
30. The Department of Commerce administers the EAA, supra note 11; the Department
of State administers the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2777-79 (1988, Supp. 11989,
& Supp. II 1990), which authorizes the creation of the Munitions Control List; and the
Department of Defense, among others powers, has the authority to "review any proposed
export of any goods or technology to any country to which exports are controlled for national
security purposes ... to recommend to the President that such export be disapproved." EAA,
50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(g).
31. See Swan, supra note 10, at 619-21. The group is currently composed of Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id at
619. The last meeting of COCOM adjourned on March 31, 1994. See 59 Fed. Reg. 25,303
(1994).
32. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403-1(c).
33. Swan, supra note 10, at 625.
34. 15 C.F.R. § 770.1(b)(1).
35. Id § 770.1(b)(2).
36. Id § 770.2(b)(3).
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greater.37 An individual found in willful violation of the EAA may be
fined up to $250,000 or imprisoned 10 years or both. Other persons
may be fined five times the value of the exports or $1,000,000, which-
ever is greater.38 Administrative sanctions for violators may also come
into play, such as debarment of an exporter from licensing eligibility.
39
Persons who disclose information relating to the national defense (i.e.,
classified information) to unauthorized parties are subject to a fine,
imprisonment for up to 10 years, or both.4
III. EXAMPLES OF CONTROLLED SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION
Examination of specific instances of U.S. government classification
and export regulation of scientific and technical data give a clearer
picture about whether such controls are appropriate and tenable, given
the clash of scientific and market values against the national security
mandates. These examples include the federal government's successful
attempt to have withdrawn over 150 papers from an open conference on
advanced optics, its unsuccessful attempt to induce U.S. research univer-
sities to monitor the activities of foreign national scientists, and the
indeterminate outcome of the case of United States v. Progressive, Inc.
41
Some more recent examples involving computer software illustrate
potential government threats to the right to communicate scientific and
technical data, and evidence reasons to believe that export controls will
not chill academic or market freedoms. These latter examples include
the GURPS Cyberpunk raid on Steve Jackson Games, Inc., and the
ongoing criminal investigation involving the dissemination of the en-
cryption scheme, "P.G.P." Part IV, infra, will address the significance of
these examples of government enforcement of controls over technical
information.
A. Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers
4 2
In 1982, the Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers
(SPIE) held an open conference in San Diego at which about 700 un-
classified papers were to be presented to scientists from 25 countries,
37. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(a).
38. Id. § 2410(b).
39. Id. § 2410(c).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 793 (1994).
41. 467 F Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
42. This account is from M. Christina Ramirez, The Balance of Interests Between
National Security Controls and First Amendment Interests in Academic Freedom, 13 J.C. &
U.L. 179, 189-91 (1986).
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including communist bloc countries. About one week before the confer-
ence began, the Department of Defense (DOD) contacted the organizers
to request a room in which they could interview DOD-funded scientists
to determine whether they had followed appropriate classification proce-
dures according to their funding contract. Panic ensued. The clear mes-
sage received by the scientists was that if they did not follow appropri-
ate classification procedures, then the reading of research results that
should have been classified would result in criminal sanctions. 43 This
caused over 150 papers to be "voluntarily" withdrawn by scientists
uncertain about whether they had followed proper procedure and who
were unwilling to risk criminal sanctions had they not. Ironically, a
DOD official intimated that if all of those scientists had followed the
right procedures, the DOD would not have been able to handle the
workload. In all likelihood, some of the withdrawn papers did contain
classifiable information under the terms of the funding grants and should
not have been presented. However, the scientists' inexperience with
information control and unwillingness to go to prison for possible
violations of national security probably caused a large number of unclas-
sifiable papers to be withdrawn.
B. University Recalcitrance about Enforcing Visa Restrictions
44
The federal government has been less successful in another attempt
to tighten national security controls on scientific information. The State
Department's authority to impose restrictions on the activities of foreign
nationals admitted to study in U.S. universities has been used as an ex
ante means of curtailing the release (and thus the export) of classified or
restrictable information. Complete enforcement of these restrictions is a
practical impossibility, which is why the State Department has attempted
to enlist the aid of the universities themselves. In response to a 1981
request that the University of Minnesota enforce security restrictions on
a visiting Chinese scientist, the president of that university wrote that
the mission of the university is to teach and that university employees
were not hired to enforce government-imposed restrictions on visiting
scholars. The president of Stanford University noted that the State
Department's similar requests to him were "outlandish," especially a
mandate to keep a visiting expert in robotics from speaking with anyone
43. Because this was an open conference, any research results could be read with
impunity under the GTDA licensing regime so long as whatever security provisions that
existed in the government funding contracts were followed. See 15 C.F.R. § 779.3; supra
notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
44. See generally Ramirez, supra note 42, at 202-04.
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working in Silicon Valley. In still another example, a Massachusetts
Institute of Technology professor received a set of questions from the
State Department regarding the activities of a visiting scholar from
Beijing. The professor did not answer the questions and had. no further
contact with the State Department regarding that scholar. These exam-
ples illustrate anecdotally the unwillingness of universities and individu-
al professors to police government security regulations covering the
activities of foreign nationals who might gain technical data that would
constitute an unauthorized export.
C. The Progressive Case
4 5
While government attempts to exert control over scientific informa-
tion were successful in the case of the SPIE, and apparently unsuccess-
ful in the case of enlisting universities to police the activities of foreign
nationals, it is unclear in the case of United States v. Progressive, Inc.
46
whether the government has acquired any leverage for such control from
the courts. The Progressive magazine assigned a journalist to write an
article designed to illustrate to readers the extent of the government's
authority and willingness to censor the press in the name of "national
security." The article was to be entitled, "The H-Bomb Secret: How We
Got It, Why We're Telling It." The journalist, using solely unclassified
and public record materials, such as physics textbooks and encyclope-
dias, wrote a compilation on how to build a hydrogen bomb. The United
States sued in district court to enjoin the publication of that article on
the grounds that the information contained within it was classified. On a
preliminary injunction, the district court agreed with the United States,
holding that the government would probably succeed on the merits in its
contention that it is possible for a collection of unclassified information
to become classified if those pieces taken as a whole are already classi-
fied. The case never went to trial because the issue was mooted when in
the course of reporting on the case, other periodicals not subject to
injunction reported essentially the contents of the Progressive's article. It
is unclear whether this holding, if made permanent on a full review,
would be a prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment protection
of free speech. If not a violation, it would be another means by which a
private cataloguing of technical information could be curtailed by na-
tional security restrictions.
45. See generally id. at 222-24.
46. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
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D. Recent Enforcements: GURPS Cyberpunk and P.G.P
Whereas the examples above took place while the cold war was the
major motivation for U.S. foreign policy, 47 two recent criminal investi-
gations involving computer software evidence how the public and the
targeted parties react when academic and market freedoms are threat-
ened by federal government controls. Even though both investigations
involve private commercial matters, the reactions of the targeted parties
analogize well .to the hypothetical response of scientists under similar
pressures who hold similar attitudes and values.
1. GURPS Cyberpunk48
A small company in Austin, Texas, named Steve Jackson Games,
Inc., (SJG), publishes a role playing game system entitled, "General
Universal Role Playing System" (GURPS). In 1990, they were about to
publish and market the "Cyberpunk" version, so called after the genre of
science fiction, popularized by author William Gibson,49 in which com-
puter hackers and corporate megaliths ally themselves to share control
of the levers of power over society. Players of this game assume the
roles of corporate executives, computer hackers, or other ne'er-do-wells
of this society, and pretend to interact in a fictional neo-apocalyptic
future where high technology used for low purposes sets the tone of
human relationships. On March 1,-1990, the United States Secret Ser-
vice raided the SJG offices and seized computer equipment and compa-
ny documents. The company was forced to suspend operations for a
month, postpone release of the new GURPS, and lay off half its em-
ployees while the Secret Service inspected the impounded documents.
No charges were ever filed, although it is conceivable that the Secret
Service was investigating for violations of the EAA or for releasing U.S.
government classified information. After drawing the computer culture's
attention to the power of the government to restrict content in commer-
cial "speech ' during the progress of a criminal investigation, SJG suc-
47. See generally Swan, supra note 10, at 607-26.
48. See generally Gregory E. Perry and Cherie Ballard, A Chip by Any Other Name
Would Still be a Potato: The Failure of Law and Its Definitions to Keep Pace with Computer
Technology, 24 TEX. TECH L. REV. 797, 804-06'(1993).
49. See WILLIAM GIBSON, THE NEUROMANCER (1984). The cyberpunk culture itself is
undergoing a personality evolution, as more people connect on-line onto the Internet global
computer network and begin to enter a world of seemingly unlimited access to information
and seemingly unlimited audiences for self-expression. This is known as cyberspace. See
Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Cyberpunk.1, TIME, Feb. 8, 1993, at 58.
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cessfully sued the U.S. government for damages incurred during the im-
poundment of its property.50
Although the search warrant was issued under seal and has not been
unsealed, the raid apparently occurred because an employee of SJG ran
a public bulletin board system (BBS) onto which a real-life computer
hacker had transmitted a stolen computer file. This computer file was
stolen from the Bellsouth Regional Bell Operating Company's comput-
ers in Atlanta and contained proprietary information regarding the
operation of the 911 emergency system. The Secret Service (which is
the federal agency charged with investigating most computer crimes)
traced the file to the SJG employee's BBS and subsequently began
investigating his employer as well.
SJG also ran a public BBS, and the Secret Service must have logged
onto it in the course of investigating the SJG employee. What they
thought they encountered was a computer BBS with a great deal of
technical information on computer security, how to break into computer
networks, and about "cyberpunk" computer hacker culture itself. What
they actually encountered was an on-line version of the new GURPS
publication that SJG always made available prior to releasing the book
form of the new version. This public pre-publication on-line version was
intended to invite consumer response to new products. Instead it invited
a search by Secret Service agents, who may have thought they had hit
the nerve center of computer crime in the United States.
2. P.G.P.
The National Security Agency (NSA) is the intelligence arm of the
federal government entrusted with eavesdropping on the world's elec-
tronic communications. 51 It is responsible both for ensuring the impreg-
nability of U.S. secret communications and for cracking the codes
protecting those of other countries.52 Computer data transmissions also
fall under this NSA mandate.
Currently the highest level of computer data encryption is an algo-
rithm called DES. It is commonly believed that the NSA is capable of
easily breaking this code, thereby enabling it to intercept any data
50. Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 816 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Tex.
1993), aff'd 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
51. See John P. Barlow, Decrypting the Puzzle Palace, COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM,
July 1992, at 25. The NSA intercepts every electronic message that goes out of the United
States and, although prohibited by law from doing so, some that are entirely domestic, using
its 12 underground acres of super computers to sort through them. Id.
52. See NSA Interference, supra note 4, at 1020-24. See also John Carey, Spy Vs.
Computer Nerd: The Fight Over Data Security, Bus. WK., Oct. 4, 1993, at 43.
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protected by DES.5 3 It is illegal to export DES in any computer-related
product or by itself without special permission from the State Depart-
ment because encryption algorithms are on the Munitions Control List
and therefore not subject to export at all.' 4 In general, it is illegal to
export any data encryption scheme. United States software and telecom-
munications companies have chafed under this restriction and claim that
because they must make exportable versions of their products with ex-
tremely weak security encryption, they are losing huge revenues to
European companies who are not under such restrictions in their world-
wide sales. 5 Consumers abroad want their communications protected,
and U.S. companies are not allowed to provide it.
Several years ago, Philip Zimmerman, an independent U.S. program-
mer, created an encryption algorithm called P.G.P. (standing for "Pretty
Good Privacy"). It can easily be incorporated into computer software
and is apparently at least as secure as DES. This program has been
freely distributed around the world and is used on thousands of personal
computers to protect against eavesdropping. On September 9, 1993, two
companies which plan to license the program for use in software,
Viacrypt of Phoenix, Arizona, and Austin Code Works of Austin, Texas,
were issued subpoenas by a federal grand jury. This criminal investiga-
tion is intended to determine whether these two companies are in viola-
tion of U.S. export restrictions by licensing the use of P.G.P. in products
which they know will be exported.
6
IV. HOLES IN THE SIEVE
The examples above, while anecdotal, illustrate situations in which
government control has clashed with academic and market freedoms.
They do not, however, reflect any clampdown by the federal govern-
ment that would greatly influence U.S. science or U.S. industry. First
Amendment protections, the easy worldwide dissemination of data over
the Internet, and cultural resistance to regulation all ensure that any
chilling effect of these export restrictions will be de minimis.
53. See John Markoff, Federal Inquiry on Software Examines Privacy Programs, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 1993, at D1.
54. See Arms Export Control Act, supra note 30; New S.P.A. Study: Export Regulations
Preclude U.S. Companies from a Cashing in on Multi-million Dollar Encryption Software
Market, Bus. WIRE, Sept. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws file [hereinaf-
ter S.P.A. Study].
55. S.RA. Study, supra note 54.
56. See generally Federal Inquiry on Software Examines Privacy Programs, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 1993, at D1.
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A. The First Amendment 7
Not only is the current regime of data classification and regulation
probably constitutionally unproblematic, but the general policy objec-
tions to U.S. government control seem unpersuasive because government
overreaching is rare and national security is a legitimate goal. Scientific
expression enjoys protection against content-based prior restraint under
the First Amendment. The case of Near v. Minnesota58 outlines the
limited exceptions in which the government may make a prior restraint
on speech. These are restraints on obstructions to military recruiting,
publication of troop numbers and movements, obscene materials, and
incitements to violence or forcible overthrow of the government.
The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) is the only federal statute explicitly
authorizing a prior restraint on dissemination of scientific research
insofar as information about atomic energy and weapons is "born clas-
sified.' '59 This was the statutory basis of the United States entering
federal court seeking an injunction against the publication of the Pro-
gressive Magazine. Part of the court's reasoning in granting a prelimi-
nary injunction against that publication was its belief that information on
nuclear weapons is like information on troop movements. It is not clear
how persuasive this reasoning would be had that case had full procedur-
al review. It is easy to imagine that portion of the AEA authorizing
injunction against publication being struck down on its face if a higher
court disagreed that a weapons system resembles a group of soldiers to
the extent that it too would fall under a prior restraint exception in
Near.6° Moreover, there has been only one other court challenge to the
national security classification of privately generated data, which sug-
gests that the administrators of the AEA have been circumspect in how
broadly they will interpretthe act.
61
Export restrictions as well are constitutionally sound, as they con-
template a licensing scheme administered on a case-by-case basis and
are probably a time, place, or manner restriction. For example, even
unclassified data subject to the strictest licensing restrictions can or-
dinarily be shared with another U.S. citizen. National security is a
constitutionally valid government interest, and overreaching in practice
57. See generally Harold P. Green, Constitutional Implications of Federal Restrictions on
Scientific Research and Communication, 60 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 619 (1992).
58. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
59. See Green, supra note 57, at 630.
.60. See id. at 637.
61. See id. at 632-33.
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seems rare, as licensing regulations contain assurances of due process in
review procedures.
Additionally, much science falls under U.S. government contract,
and few can object that the U.S. government has a proprietary interest in
the results of such research for enforcing the contractual provisions that
restrict their communication. 62 The SPIE case, in which contractual
terms within the funding grants authorized DOD restrictions, stands out
more as an anecdote of bureaucratic befuddlement than as a symptom of
systematic censorship. The vigor of the United States' enforcement of
these contractual provisions has varied under different administrations
and different circumstances, but their validity as controls over govern-
ment "property" is even less subject to constitutional challenge than is
the case of classification of privately generated information.63 Moreover,
governmental control over funding itself appears to have more of an
influence over what academic science gets done than enforcement of
export regulations. The First Amendment remains a sound barrier pro-
tecting scientists from illegitimate government encroachment on their
endeavor.
B. The Internet.
Another factor protecting fundamental research in addition to
special treatment under the export regulations is the access most U.S.
scientists have to the Internet global computer network. They can
transmit data to colleagues worldwide almost instantaneously. Originally
a project of the DOD Advanced Research Projects Administration, the
Internet has grown from a military logistics and supply tool linking a
few military bases to an immense web of research institutions, corpora-
tions, military, and other organizations. Estimates on its ,current number
of users vary from about 10 million to over 20 million, with a growth
rate estimated at around 10% more new users every month. 64 Any
computer data file can be transmitted to any other person on the net-
work in a very short time, depending only on the file's size. The U.S.
government, cable companies, and telephone companies have all ex-
pressed a commitment to enlarge the Internet user base, improve its
"backbone" to allow even faster transmission speeds, and expose a
greater diversity of people to the social and educational benefits of the
62. See id. at 628.
63. l at 628-29.
64. See John Burgess, Data Highways... Can We Get There From Here?, WASH. POST,
May 2, 1993, at HI, H7.
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network. 65 The current academic and "cyberpunk" culture of Internet
users is evolving, unwillingly in some cases, to fit the new commercial
and educational role that the network will soon have.6
Eavesdropping on extraterritorial transmissions, the NSA's mandate,
will clearly become more difficult if only because of the increasing
volume and size of transmissions.67 Any enforcement capability that it
)has right now over preventing illegal transmissions of scientific data
may soon be whittled away, especially if private groups are successful
in creating encryptions that the NSA cannot break, or at least not with-
out difficulty. This, according to some, explains the U.S. government's
zealousness in prosecuting criminal cases which may involve groups
capable of compromising the NSA's tenuous ability to maintain over-
sight over data communications. 8
There is an irony in that the medium seems to have spawned its
own protections from U.S. government control, thereby prodding the
federal government to enforce the controls it still has. In the case of
P.G.P., the program apparently traveled the world via the Internet.
Likewise, DES has been transmitted to restricted areas over the Internet.
In this respect, regulations that prevent the export of any information,
classified or unclassified, private or government sponsored, seem out-
moded to the degree that violations cannot be policed.
C. The Norms of Science
Like the cyberpunks' neo-libertarian aversion to any commercializa-
tion or regulation of the Internet, scientists' values in favor of free and
open communication of scientific results will serve as a check on gov-
ernment abridgment of academic freedom. Cultural norms are commonly
attributed to scientists who pursue the goal of the "extension of certified
knowledge." 69 The freedom to communicate results is a value that rests
on the norms within the scientific community of "universalism, commu-
nism [sic], disinterestedness, and organized skepticism."70 Without the
65. See id. at HI; Data Communications Program Charted Future Information Highway,
87 A.B.A. SEC. ScI. & TECH. 9 (1993); Tim Studt, Can High Performance Networks Meet
Future R & D Needs: Network Technology For Research and Development, R & D, Oct.
1992, at 30.
66. See generally Cyberpunk!, supra note 49.
67. See Spy Vs. Computer Nerd: The Fight over Data Security, supra note 52, at 43.
68. See id.
69. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotech-
nology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 183 (1987), (quoting R. MERTON, The Normative Struc-
ture of Science, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE at 267 (1973)).
70. Id.
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freedom of a scientist to expose his or her peers to the results of re-
search, the program of extending knowledge could become weakened
because these norms could not be followed. Other scientists would not
be able to verify results by replicating research, experimental design
could not be reviewed with other experts in a particular field to iron out
bugs, a culture of suspicion might replace a culture of openness, and
subsequent empirical testing could not build upon results.
Nevertheless, aside from the case of the AEA (which might ulti-
mately not pass a constitutional review), restrictions on private academic
science do not in principle exist. Export regulations under the EAA do
not touch upon "fundamental research" performed by private actors. In
fact, those regulations affect only research that is the performed with a
proprietary interest in mind. Restrictions on communications regarding
such research arguably do not clash with the norms of science at all
because proprietary science is usually secret anyway.7' The U.S. govern-
ment does have a legitimate proprietary interest in research performed
under government contract, and President Reagan's 1985 directive on
scientific research proclaims that the products of "fundamental research"
even under U.S. governmental control should not be classified, to the
extent nonclassification is possible. This introduces some element of
discretion in the control of such research, but it has only been in the last
decade that real opposition to classification in the abstract has been
voiced by scientists.72 This leads one to wonder how scientists felt about
classification in the first thirty years that it was a common U.S. govern-
ment method of control over communication of U.S. sponsored research
results.73
It is possible that in the last ten years the federal government has
been more vigorous than in the previous thirty years in enforcing its
proprietary rights over research results. If this is true, then scientists will
let the government know in which circumstances it has crossed a line in
opposition to the norms of science in a way damaging to the extension
and certification of knowledge. The DOD classification review at the
SPIE was considered anomalous in the scientific community, and be-
came the focus of outrage for many years afterward.74 President Rea-
gan's 1985 directive on scientific research was issued in response to the
concerns by scientists that fundamental research would be threatened
71. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 69.
72. See Green, supra note 57, at 642.
73. See id.
74. See Ramirez, supra note 42, at 191.
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under the current classification regime.75 The uncooperativeness of
university professors and administrators with the Department of State in
enforcing visa restrictions also points to circumstances of scientists
holding their ground in support of their institutional norms. The Internet
is a simple and fast means of "civil disobedience" to those scientists
who feel morally compelled to resist regulations which they believe
oppose their fundamental project, as the writer of P.G.P. might have
done.76 The norms of science ensure that academic freedom will remain
largely untouched by any regulatory scheme that is constitutionally
valid.
CONCLUSION
The federal government has several means to the control of techni-
cal data in the form of scientific research results. These include security
classification and export regulation under the EAA. While some may
object that these controls are wrong in principle, this is probably not the
case because national security is a legitimate government end. While
others might object that these controls are wrong as applied, this too is
probably not the case because constitutional protections, the ease with
which scientists may disobey the controls, and attitudes of scientists
compelling them to voice concern when it is necessary all suggest that
overreaching by the government would be rare and incapable of greatly
diverting the progress of the scientific endeavor.
75. See Swan, supra note 10, at 617-23.
76. Carey, supra note 52, at 43.
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